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Abstract: This contribution deals with the harmonization of provisional and protective 
measures in the European Union at the background of the Storme Report of 1993. 
Attention is paid to function and aim of provisional and protective measures, the recent 
and ongoing reform of procedural laws in several Member States, harmonization of 
procedural law, harmonization initiatives concerning provisional and protective 
measures (amongst others ILA and UNIDROIT), the case law of the ECJ laying down 
certain criteria for provisional and protective measures, and the proposals of the Storme 
Report are being reviewed for further deliberation and use for future harmonization.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Provisional and protective measures can be found in every developed legal system. The 
rules concerning these measures, and especially the requirements for obtaining such a 
measure, as well as the contents and their scope, are however quite different. To get a full 
understanding of the provisional and protective measures existing in other legal system 
than ones own requires knowledge of the procedural system of that country as a whole. 
These measures are imbedded in a legal system that safeguards rights through a variety of 
procedures and measures, and they cannot be studied separately. For example the 
Netherlands, contrary to Germany and several other countries, does not have a procedure 
that resembles the Mahnverfahren – a summary procedure for non-contradicted monetary 
claims. This is, however, overcome by the possibility to apply for a provisional payment 
in the kort geding procedure. Although this results in a provisional judgment, there is no 
need to start principal proceedings, and especially in clear cases parties will not commence 
main proceedings. So, in practice the kort geding procedure fills ‘gaps’ that may not exist 
in other legal systems. 
 Between 1994, when the Storme-report was published, and now, there have been a lot 
of developments. In the first place, in several European countries important reforms of the 
rules of civil procedure were initiated. These reforms result from the urgent necessity to 
improve efficiency and reduce costs of civil litigation. Secondly, also other projects on the 
harmonisation of procedural law were started, including provisional and protective 
measures. In the third place, the European Court of Justice gave several preliminary 
rulings on provisions of conventions concerning provisional and protective measures, that 
have to be taken into account as well when the harmonisation of these measures is 
considered. 
 In this report successively attention will be paid to the concept of provisional and 
protective measures, the reforms of procedural law in several European countries, the 
international harmonisation of procedural law, the developments concerning provisional 
and protective measures in international litigation and the several drafts for harmonisation. 
Finally, some concluding remarks will be made on the necessity and desirability of 
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harmonisation of provisional and protective measures on the basis of the draft 
Storme/Tarzia.1    
 
2. Provisional and protective measures; aim and function 
 
Provisional and protective measures are a fundamental part of civil justice. They are 
necessary to secure the enforcement of decisions and to provide measures in urgent cases. 
Because the duration of normal proceedings is in some countries very long and the civil 
case load grows, the need for provisional measures has become more urgent in the last few 
decades.2 These procedures are sometimes not only commenced parallel to or before 
commencing normal (principal) proceedings, but also in stead of the main proceedings, in 
order to save – shortly – time and money.  
 Provisional and protective measures are, at least in European continental doctrine, 
usually divided into three kinds of remedies.3 In the first place, measures that are meant to 
secure the enforcement of the decision on the merits (conservatory measures). In the 
second place, regulatory measures, that cover a wide range of measures that can be 
ordered to maintain the status quo or to give a provisional arrangement of some kind. 
Thirdly, the so-called anticipatory measures, which can grant claims similar to those in 
principal proceedings, such as (interim) payments. Especially as regards the anticipatory 
measures the differences between the European legal systems are substantial.     
An important feature of the (national) rules for provisional and protective measures is 
that they leave room for discretion. A judge has to be able to decide on the basis of the 
urgency and other circumstances of the case whether to grant a measure or not, and what 
the contents should be. For example in the Netherlands, there are only nine provisions in 
the Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering) concerning the 
kort geding. Most rules are formulated in practice, and they are highly dependant upon the 
factual circumstances of the case, other possibilities for safeguarding certain rights, and 
also efficiency reasons. This will remain the same under the reformed Code of Civil 
Procedure.4   
 
3. Reforms of procedural law in Europe 
 
The most significant reform of national procedural law since the Storme-report of course 
took place in the United Kingdom. In 1994 the reforms were initiated and on April 26, 
1999 the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) came in force. The reform had as its most 
important objectives the improvement of access to justice, reduction of the costs of 
litigation, reduction of the complexity of litigation, modernisation of terminology and  
removing unnecessary distinctions between the rules, practice and procedure.5 The CPR 
contains a part with quite extensive rules on interim injunctions (Part 25). These rules did 
not bring about very fundamental changes to the rules concerning provisional measures, 
                                                     
1  M. Storme (ed.), Rapprochement du Droit Judiciaire de L'Union européenne/Approximation of 
Judiciary Law in the European Union, Dordrecht/Boston/Londen: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994, p. 
203-207. 
2  P.A.M. Meijknecht en R.C. Verschuur, The (ab)use of summary proceedings, in: W.G.Ph.E. Wedekind 
(ed.), The Eighth World Conference on Procedural Law, Justice and efficiency. General reports and 
discussions, Deventer/Antwerpen/Boston: Kluwer 1989, p. 365-403, esp. p. 402. 
3  See e.g. Storme (ed.) 1994 (note 1), p. 106; Meijknecht and Verschuur 1989 (note 2), p. 371-390.  
4  See para 3 for the reforms of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. 
5  See e.g. N.H. Andrews, English civil Procedure: Three Aspects of the Long Revolution, Centro di studi 
e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, Roma 2001; N.H. Andrews, A New Civil Procedural Code 
for England: Party-Control `Going, Going, Gone', CJQ 2000, p. 19-38.  
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though in perspective of the aims of the reform, the granting of interim injunctions should 
also be dependant on the question whether the costs involved are in proportion with the 
interests at stake (especially the search order implies high costs) and whether interim 
proceedings will not delay the (principal) procedure.6  
Another important, though less ‘radical’, reform currently takes place in the 
Netherlands. In October 1999, a draft on the revision of the Dutch Civil Procedural Code 
was put before Parliament.7 It is assumed that the new rules will enter into force on 
January 1 or March 1, 2002. As in England, the reforms are primarily meant to simplify 
procedural law, and to cut back formalities. The relation between the parties and the court 
is altered; the judge has to participate more actively in the proceedings and parties have 
the duty to co-operate. The procedure has to become more efficient, which means that the 
duration of the process should be more acceptable whereas the quality remains guaranteed.   
It is noticeable that the functioning of the most important provisional procedure in the 
Netherlands, the kort geding procedure (originally derived from the French référé) is not 
subject to criticism. In the Netherlands, practitioners as well as legal scholars, are usually 
quite satisfied with this procedure, that is regarded as effective, quick and of good quality. 
The Dutch kort geding practice probably is the most dynamic and liberal in Europe.8 The 
reform of the Code of Civil Procedure will only bring about minor changes to the 
provisions regarding the kort geding, except for the introduction of a new article.9 This 
new rule implements the obligation to commence the main proceedings within a certain 
period of time in intellectual property cases that are covered by the TRIPs-agreement. This 
results from the preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Hermès case of 
1998.10 In this case the court decided that the obligation to commence the main 
proceedings – as laid down in art. 50, section 6 of this convention – also applies to the 
Dutch kort geding procedure. This implies a limitation of Dutch legal practice in 
intellectual property cases that is regretted by many legal practitioners and scholars. 
 
4. The harmonisation of procedural law 
 
The current efforts to come to a harmonisation or unification of procedural law, including 
rules concerning provisional measures, can be distinguished in a regional – European – 
and a universal approach. The Storme Working Group chose to formulate rules that apply 
to all proceedings, regardless whether they are national or transnational, that are conducted 
in the European Union.11 Since this report was published in 1994, several other initiatives 
were employed to come to a harmonisation of procedural law. These projects have a 
different point of departure, but are nevertheless worth while looking at to see what 
tendencies can be discerned in the development of procedural law, and in particular 
regarding provisional and protective measures.  
 
                                                     
6  C. Plant e.a. (ed.), Blackstone's Guide to the Civil Procedure Rules, Londen: Blackstone Press 1999, p. 
157-159. 
7 Wetsvoorstel (draft) herziening van het procesrecht voor burgerlijke zaken, in het bijzonder de wijze 
van procederen in eerste aanleg, Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 855. 
8  About 10 to 12% of the civil cases are commenced by way of the kort geding, and only in about 5 % of 
the cases parties do commence main proceedings parallel to or after commencing a kort geding. 
Especially in the field of intellectual property and for interim payments, the kort geding is a very 
important legal measure. 
9  Art. 2.13.7 of the draft. 
10  ECJ 16 June 1998, C-53/96, ECR [1998] p. I-3637. See also para 5 below. 
11  Storme (ed.) 1994 (note 1), p. 62. 
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4.1 Universal harmonisation of procedural law 
 
Several institutes offer contributions to a universal harmonisation of procedural law. The 
projects set up by these institutions aim at a ‘world-wide’ harmonisation, as opposed to the 
Storme Working Group, that focuses on the approximation of European procedural law. 
The International Law Association (ILA) published rules regarding provisional measures 
in international litigation in 1996 (Helsinki Principles).12 Furthermore, a working group of 
the American Law Institute (ALI) begun its work on the so-called ‘Transnational Rules of 
Civil Procedure’.13 In 1999 ILA and UNIDROIT formed a combined working group, that 
published a draft in 2001.14 In paragraph 5 below these initiatives will be discussed more 
in detail as far as they concern provisional and protective measures. 
 
4.2 European harmonisation of procedural law 
 
Since the draft of the Storme Working Group was published, no harmonisation projects 
concerning national procedural law were undertaken. Article 65 EC Treaty, that was 
brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam that entered into force in 1999, empowers the 
European Union to take measures in the field of judicial co-operation. The work that has 
been done since shows that harmonisation of private international law and procedural rules 
have a high priority within the European Union. Five Regulations have meanwhile been 
established, all concerning procedural matters. Legal unity is further promoted by the 
Tampere conclusions.  
Furthermore, the harmonisation of substantive private law has meanwhile also taken 
up interest of many European scholars.15 Harmonisation of substantive law also has 
procedural implications.16  
These developments necessitate further deliberations on the harmonisation of 
procedural law in Europe. The efforts to reform procedural law in many European 
countries and the desire to improve access to justice and improve efficiency of litigation 
can be regarded as a receptive ground as well.17  
 
5. Other proposals on harmonisation of provisional and protective measures 
 
Besides the Storme Working Group also other working groups and committees made 
recent proposals for harmonising procedural law. The most important drafts concerning 
provisional and protective measures will be discussed in order to widen our view and see 
whether they can be valuable for a harmonisation in the European context as well. 
                                                     
12  Crawford en M. Bijers (eds.), The International Law Association. Report of the sixty-seventh 
Conference held at Helsinki, Finland 12 to 17 August 1996, Londen: Cambrian Printers 1996, p. 185-
204 (second interim report provisional and protective measures in international litigation). 
13  The American Law Institute, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, Discussion Draft No 1  
(December 1998, March 1999). 
14  The American Law Institute, ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure,  
Discussion Draft No. 2 (April 12, 2001). See e.g. R. Stürner, Modellregeln für den internationalen 
Zivilprozeß?, ZZP 1999, p. 185-216. 
15  See amongst others: A.S. Hartkamp (ed.) Towards a European Civil Code, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 
1994 and 1998. 
16  M. Storme, Procedural Consequences of a Common Private Law for Europe, in: Hartkamp (ed.) 1994 
(see note 15), p. 87-99; D. Kerameus, Procedural Implications of Civil Law Unification, in: Hartkamp 
(ed.) 1998 (see note 15), p. 121-132. 
17  See on the current problems in (European) procedural law: A.A.S. Zuckerman, Civil Justice in Crisis, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999. 
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The Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation of the International 
Law Association (ILA) formulated the Principles on provisional and protective measures 
in international litigation (Helsinki Principles). The purpose of these Principles is to 
indicate, for the potential assistance of law reformers both at the national and international 
level, the Committee’s views on a range of issues concerning provisional and protective 
measures in international litigation.18 They are not intended to be exhaustive, but meant as 
a potential approach. Principle 1 reads as follows: 
 
Provisional and protective measures perform two principal purposes in civil and commercial 
litigation: 
 
 (a) to maintain the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial; or 
 (b) to secure assets out of which an ultimate judgment may be satisfied. 
  
An interim payment is not regarded as a provisional measure, according to Principle 22: 
 
The procedure in domestic law under which the court may order an interim payment (i.e. an 
outright payment to the plaintiff which may be subsequently revised on final judgment) is not a 
provisional and protective measure in the context of international litigation.  
 
The scope of these rules, or in other words: the concept of provisional and protective 
measures, is narrower than in the Storme/Tarzia draft (see Article 10.1). Only measures to 
maintain the status quo during trial and conservatory measures are regarded as provisional 
or protective measures. This concept seems to be a bit too narrow for a European 
perspective.19  
Principle 16 confers jurisdiction to the court that exercises jurisdiction over the 
substance of the matter. According to Principle 17 courts that do not have jurisdiction as 
to the substance of the case, can nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over assets located 
within its jurisdiction. 
 On the granting of a provisional or protective measure Principle 4 states:
 
The grant of such relief should be discretionary. It should be available: 
 (a) on a showing of a case on the merits on a standard of proof which is less than that required for 
the merits under the applicable law; and 
 (b) on a showing that the potential injury to the plaintiff outweighs the potential injury to the 
defendant. 
 
Provisional and protective measures can be recognised and enforced according to 
Principles 18, 19 and 20. A court should co-operate where necessary in order to achieve 
the efficacy of orders issued by other courts. 
 Although these Principles seem to be more orientated on the common law than on 
European continental law and are meant for international  litigation, they look well-
balanced and some of them could be taken into consideration when drafting rules for a 
European harmonisation.    
 The draft of the American Law Institute in co-operation with UNIDROIT of 2001 is 
apparently based on a common law (American) model. The purpose of these Rules is to 
offer a system of fair procedure for litigants involved in legal disputes arising from 
transnational transactions.20 Rule 17.1 reads as follows: 
                                                     
18  Crawford and Bijers (eds.) 1996 (note 11), p. 192. 
19  See also para 2 above. 
20  ALI/UNIDROIT 2001 (note 14), p. 14. 
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In accordance with forum law and subject to applicable international conventions, the court 
may issue an injunction to restrain or require conduct of any person who is subject to the 
court’s authority where necessary to preserve the status quo or to prevent irreparable injury 
pending the litigation. The extent of such a remedy shall be governed by the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
Rule 17.1.1 allows ex parte measures in very urgent cases. According to Rule 17.1.3 the 
applicant is liable for full indemnification if it turns out that the injunction was wrongly 
granted. The granting of the measure can be subject to a bond (Rule 17.1.4). The kinds of 
measures that may be requested are set out in Rule 17.2: 
 
An injunction may restrain a person over whom the court has jurisdiction from transferring 
property or assets, wherever located, pending the conclusion of the litigation and require a 
party to promptly reveal the whereabouts of its assets, including assets under its control, and of 
persons whose identity is relevant.  
 
According to Rule 17.3, recognition and enforcement are governed by the law of the 
country where the property or assets are located, and by means of an injunction by the 
competent court of that country. Rule 1 states that jurisdiction should be exercised within 
the limits of generally recognised principles of international law, including conventions 
adopted in the forum state.  
 Although these Rules of course have their value as a source of harmonisation of laws 
concerning provisional and protective measures, I am of the opinion that these particular 
rules are so clearly orientated on American law, that they cannot serve as a base for 
harmonisation in a European context.  
 
6. Provisional measures in Regulations and Conventions 
 
The Storme Working Group rightfully started its orientation on provisional and protective 
measures with Article 24 Brussels Convention as an important European provision for 
these measures. In 1998 and 1999 the European Court of Justice delivered three important 
preliminary rulings on provisional and protective measures. The first one concerned the 
concept of ‘provisional measures’ in Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement (this agreement 
was brought about after the publication of the Storme-report). The second and third 
decision concerned Article 24 Brussels Convention.   
 
6.1 Article 24 Brussels Convention and Lugano Convention – Article 31 Brussels 
Regulation 
 
Within six months the Court of Justice gave two preliminary rulings on the interpretation 
of Article 24 Brussels Convention (= Article 31 Brussels Regulation). The first one is the 
Van Uden/Deco-Line case of 17 November 1998.21 The second one is the Mietz case of 27 
April 1999.22 Both cases concerned questions about the Dutch ‘kort geding procedure’. 
This is an important provisional procedure, which can be commenced in urgent cases, 
independently from the main proceedings. Although in legal respect the measure provided 
                                                     
21  ECJ November 17, 1998 (C-391/95), (1998) ECR, p. I-7091, 46 NILR, p. 102 (1999).   
22  ECJ April 27, 1999 (C-99/96), (1999) ECR, p. I-2277. 
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for in this procedure, has a provisional character, in practice it is in most cases accepted as 
a ‘final’ judgment, because parties do not start the main proceedings afterwards.23
 In the Van Uden case, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) conferred preliminary 
questions to the Court of Justice on the position of this kort geding procedure under the 
Brussels Convention. The two most crucial questions were, however, whether the kort 
geding procedure, and especially an interim payment, can be regarded as a provisional 
measure within the meaning of Article 24 and whether on the basis of this provision the 
national jurisdiction rules are unimpeded.  The Court did not explicitly state that in general 
measures provided for in the kort geding procedure can be regarded as provisional 
measures within the meaning of the convention. The Court merely repeated the decisions 
of the Denilauler/Couchet case24 and the Reichert and Kockler case.25 In Denilauler the 
Court held that the granting of these measures requires particular care and detailed 
knowledge of the actual circumstances in which they are to take effect; the court of the 
place where the assets are located, are those best able to assess these circumstances. In the 
Reichert case, the Court ruled that Art. 24 covers measures ‘which, in matters within the 
scope of the Convention, are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to 
safeguard rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case.’ In Van Uden, the Court added that interim 
payments do not constitute a provisional measure, unless the repayment to the defendant is 
guaranteed if the main proceedings are unsuccessful, and the measure relates only to 
specific assets of the defendant located, or to be located, within the confines of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court to which the application is made. Furthermore, the 
granting of provisional and protective measures on the basis of Article 24 is conditional on 
the existence of a real connecting link between the subject-matter of the measures sought 
and the territorial jurisdiction of the state of the court before which those measures are 
sought. For interim payments, as can be derived from the definition, this criterion means 
that the jurisdiction on the basis of Article 24, is narrowed down to the courts of the place 
where specific assets of the defendant are located, or to be located. For other measures, the 
open criterion of the real connecting link applies.      
 In the Mietz case, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) referred to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, concerning the recognition and enforcement of a 
Dutch kort geding measure. The question was, once again, whether an interim payment, 
ordered in kort geding, is a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 24. This 
was relevant because the Dutch kort geding judge did not have jurisdiction on the basis of 
Articles 2-18 (= 2-24 Regulation). Moreover, possibly Article 14 (= 16 Regulation) was 
applicable – the German Supreme court also asked preliminary questions about the 
applicability of the provisions for consumer contracts –, the violation of which constitutes 
a ground of refusal for recognition and enforcement according to Article 28, s. 1 (= 35, s. 
2 Regulation). 
 The Court of Justice argued, in the first place, that it was not relevant whether this 
case concerned a consumer contract or not, because Article 24 enables a court to order a 
provisional measure although it has no jurisdiction as to the merits of the case. This time 
the Court plainly stated that the kort geding is a procedure of the type envisaged in Article 
24. The Court came to this decision after considering the features of this procedure 
                                                     
23 See X.E. Kramer, Het kort geding in internationaal perspectief. Een rechtsvergelijkende studie naar de 
voorlopige voorziening in het internationaal privaatrecht (‘The Dutch kort geding in an international 
perspective. A comparative view on provisional and protective measures and private international law,’; 
with English summary at p. 363-375), Deventer: Kluwer 2001. 
24  ECJ May 21, 1980 (C-125/79), (1980) ECR, p. I-1553.  
25  ECJ March 26, 1992 (C-261/90), (1992) ECR, p. I-2149.  
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according to Article 289 ff of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, the Court 
determined that in principle, the recognition and enforcement of a provisional or 
protective measure can only be refused on the grounds set out in Article 27 and 28. But 
when the court that orders the measure has no jurisdiction as to the substance of the case, 
and goes beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of Article 24, recognition and enforcement 
must be refused. In this case Article 24 had been violated, because the interim payment 
could not be regarded as a provisional measure within the meaning this Article. 
 Some conclusions can drawn on the basis of these decisions. In the first place, the 
concept of ‘provisional and protective measures’ seems to be rather broad. In the Mietz 
case the Court clearly stated, under reference to Dutch law, that the kort geding is a 
procedure that is covered by Article 24 (= 31 Regulation), although sometimes far 
reaching, clearly anticipatory, measures are granted in this procedure. It is, however, 
according to the Court important that when a measure is granted on the basis of Article 24 
that a national court considers the need to impose conditions to guarantee the provisional 
character.26  The limitations for interim payments are in compliance with national 
European laws. The guarantee of repayment is a requirement in most countries.27 The 
requirement that assets of the defendant must be present within the jurisdiction is only 
important for international jurisdiction, and if these rules were to be taken into 
consideration for a harmonisation of procedural law, national litigation would not be 
effected by this requirement.    
 
6.2 Article 50 TRIPS Agreement 
 
Another important international rule on provisional measures is contained in Article 50 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (TRIPS 
Agreement). In several European countries, such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, 
provisional measures play an important role in the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. In the Netherlands these rights are usually effected through the kort geding 
procedure, at least until a few years ago. Principal proceedings were seldom commenced. 
Article 50, section 6 TRIPS, however, states that upon request by the defendant, the 
provisional measure shall be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect in case the 
principal proceedings are not commenced within a reasonable period.28 The question was 
whether the Dutch kort geding can also be regarded as a provisional measure within the 
meaning of this provision. In 1998, a few months before the Van Uden decision, the 
European Court of Justice decided in the Hermès case that the kort geding is a provisional 
                                                     
26  To me it is still not completely clear whether the term ‘provisional, including protective, measures’ has 
an autonomous meaning under the convention. On the one hand, in the Reichert case a general 
definition was given and also in the Van Uden and Mietz case, a more or less clear description of an 
interim payment as provisional measure was provided. On the other hand, Article 24 refers to measures 
‘as may be available under the law’ of a state, and in the Mietz case the Court established that the 
Dutch kort geding is a provisional measure, because the Dutch law provides thus. Maybe it is neither 
purely autonomous, nor only up to the lex fori. In my opinion, it can be argued that in principle it is up 
to the lex fori of the court to which application is made to determine whether or not it is a provisional 
or protective measure. This is clear for the interim payment. An interim payment can be provided for 
by the courts on the conditions of their own law, but this involves the risk of non-enforcement when 
the court has no jurisdiction on the merits, and the provisional character is not guaranteed by taking 
into account the conditions for the application of Article 24. The effect of these measures is limited to 
the territory of that state. In other words, the outer limits are determined by the convention. 
27  See e.g. for the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland and England: Kramer (note 23), 
p. 126. 
28  This period is to be determined by the court; if the court does not, this the maximum period will be 20 
working days or 31 calendar days. 
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measure within the meaning of this Article.29 This means that the obligation to commence 
the main proceedings also applies to the Dutch kort geding procedure and similar 
proceedings in other countries, such as the French référé as well. 
This ruling is very important for some countries and also leads to harmonisation of 
the use of provisional measures in intellectual property cases. It should be taken into 
account when discussing harmonised rules for the European Union.30
 
6.3 Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
  
In the context of the proposal for a Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and 
enforcement, the initial plan was to include a definition on ‘provisional and protective 
measures’ in the provision on jurisdiction regarding these measures. This definition 
needed to be more specific than the resolution of the International Law Association (see 
under 5 above).31 A few years later, however, the Special Commission deliberated the 
following:32  
 
 The question of how to define the concept of `provisional and protective measures' is a tricky one 
to resolve. It seems that, in view of the great variety of measures of this kind in the different legal 
and judicial systems involved, a definition is difficult to find. Besides, its value is not obvious. It 
could, in fact, complicate rather than simplify issues. For this reason it should perhaps be 
avoided. 
 
During the nineteenth session of the Hague Conference in June 2001, the working group on 
provisional and protective measures came up with another proposal for a jurisdiction rule, 
that nevertheless contains a paragraph on what is meant by provisional measures and 
protective measures.33 Article 13, section 3, of this proposal states that it means: 
 
(a) a measure to maintain the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial; or 
(b) a measure providing a preliminary means of securing assets out of which an ultimate 
judgment may be satisfied; or 
(c) a measure to restrain conduct by a defendant to prevent current or imminent future harm.   
 
This definition seems to be a bit stricter than Article 10.1.2 en 10.1.3 of the Storme/Tarzia 
draft. Pure anticipatory measures and interim payments are excluded. This project shows 
again how difficult it is to come to a consensus of what should be regarded as ‘provisional 
and protective measures’.34   
 In Article 13, section 1, jurisdiction is conferred upon the court that has jurisdiction 
as to the substance. In section 2 a limited jurisdiction besides section 1 is created for an 
order in respect of property. 
                                                     
29  ECJ 16 June 1998, C-53/96, ECR [1998] p. I-3637. 
30  It must be noted, however, that this provision does not have a direct effect in the member states. See 
ECJ 14 December 2000, C-300/98 (Tuk/Dior) and ECJ 13 September 2001, C-89/99 (Schieving-
Nijstad/Groeneveld). 
31  Kessedjian, Synthesis of the work of the Special Commission of June 1997 on international 
jurisdiction and the effects of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters (Prel.Doc.No 8), 
November 1997, p. 49. 
32  Document de discussion des questions portées à l'ordre du jour de la commission spéciale de juin 
1999/Issues paper for the agenda of the Special Commission of June 1999, Mei 1999, p. 17, no 14.4. 
33  Work Doc. No 95 E & F, Commission II, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Nineteenth Session, 18 June 2001. 
34  A draft on the revision of the Brussels Convention of the Commission (OJ 1999, C-33/05) also 
contained a definition of provisional measures, but this was not adopted.  
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7. Desirability and necessity of harmonisation; evaluation of the Storme/Tarzia draft 
 
The Storme/Tarzia draft on provisional and protective measures is divided into eight 
subjects or parts: 1. the kind of measures that can be granted, 2. the conditions for 
provisional remedies, 3. the right to be heard (the procedure), 4. jurisdiction, 5. recourse, 
6. variation or withdrawal of the remedy, 7. absence of res judicata and annulment of the 
judgment, 8. execution. Below, these topics will be shortly discussed, as well as the need 
of harmonisation for each topic.35 Number 1 and 7, and number 5 and 6 will be discussed 
together. The point of departure is that a certain kind of harmonisation in the field of 
provisional and protective measures is desirable.   
 
7.1 The concept, contents and character of provisional and protective measures 
 
In Part 10.1 of the Storme/Tarzia draft a rather broad concept of provisional and protective 
measures is employed. Not only conservatory and regulatory measures, but also some 
anticipatory measures are covered. This seems to me to be a good approach from a 
European perspective.36 The concepts of the ILA and ALI/UNIDROIT drafts (see para 5 
above) are in my opinion too narrow.37 I think that there is no need for a further 
harmonisation in this respect, and this might even be undesirable. In the field of 
provisional and protective measures the courts should have a certain discretion, dependant 
on for example the duration of normal proceedings in certain cases and other measures 
that are at hand in a particular legal system to safeguard certain rights (e.g. fast-track 
proceedings). Civil justice might came at stake when the scope and contents of provisional 
measures is narrowed, whereas there are no other means to guarantee a relatively quick 
and cheap judgment. For example in the Netherlands the kort geding procedure is also 
used to fill the gap that would otherwise exist in legal protection, because of the growth of 
legal procedures, and the (subsequent) high costs and long duration of normal 
proceedings. The rules regarding the kort geding are for the greater part formulated in 
practice, and differ per field of law. Nevertheless the kort geding is very popular and 
regarded as an effective measure that guarantees the rights of both plaintiff and defendant. 
  The description of the character of the measure in Part 10.7 is in my opinion useful. 
These provisions are the real essence of what a provisional measure is: it lacks res judicata 
in any subsequent proceedings (Article 10.7.1), and the judgment is automatically 
annulled by a judgment which declares that the right for protection of which the 
provisional remedy was granted does not exist (Article 10.7.3). It could, however, be 
desirable to explain what exactly the consequences of the annulment are, because this 
differs per country. In the Netherlands the decision remains valid for the period before the 
principal judgment was rendered. This means for example that ‘contempt fines’ 
(dwangsommen, astreinte, Zwangsgeld) that the defendant had to pay because he did not 
comply with the provisional judgment are still due. Further explication in order to come to 
a real harmonisation seems to be necessary. 
   
                                                     
35  These comments are of course partly the result of my familiarity with especially the Dutch kort geding, 
and ‘deviating’ provisions will possibly raise more questions in my view, whereas for foreign lawyers 
it might be a clear and acceptable provision. 
36  See also para 2 above. 
37  The provisional definition of the draft Hague Convention comes close to that of the Storme/Tarzia 
draft. 
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7.2 Jurisdiction regarding provisional and protective measures 
 
The jurisdiction rule laid down in Article 10.4 is in my opinion useful, but too narrow. It is 
not in compliance with the Brussels Convention/Regulation and the rulings of the Court of 
Justice. Article 10.4.1 confers jurisdiction upon the court of the defendant and the court 
where the measure is to be enforced. According to Article 24 (= 31 Regulation) and the 
rulings of the Court of Justice, however, all courts that have jurisdiction in the principal 
proceedings also have jurisdiction regarding provisional and protective measures. 
Furthermore, all other courts whose territory is closely connected to the measures, have 
jurisdiction.38 This is in the first place of course the court of the place where the measure 
is to take effect, but also other circumstances might constitute a real connection.39 The 
Court also decided that jurisdiction on the basis of Article 24 remains in tact when the 
proceedings are already commenced somewhere else.40 Maybe in national proceedings it 
is more logical to apply for provisional measures in the same court as where the main 
proceedings are pending, but since the draft also covers international proceedings, the 
formulation is somewhat lacking; at least in my opinion the difference between national 
and international litigation should be more profound.  
  
7.3 Conditions for granting provisional and protective measures  
 
Part 10.2 on the conditions for granting a measure seems to be in conformity with the 
character of provisional measures. The court should have a certain discretion whether to 
grant a measure or not, depending on the circumstances. As a harmonisation proposal it is 
in my opinion sufficient; the open formulation is in this regard only a positive feature.   
 
7.4 The procedure 
 
Article 10.3.1 states that in principal the procedure will be contradictory. In very urgent 
and exceptional circumstances the measures can, however, be granted ex parte. This 
possibility can be found in many national rules for provisional measures, but not in all 
countries. In the Netherlands, the kort geding is always inter partes. The same goes for the 
French référé. The strength and legitimacy of the kort geding is partially created by the 
guarantee that the defendant is always heard. Conservatory measures, such as the 
conservatory attachment (conservatoir beslag) are however not handled in a regular kort 
geding, and can be granted ex parte. In these cases the applicant must start the main 
proceedings within a certain (short) period, otherwise the measure will cease to have 
effect. It might be an idea to consider whether the possibility to grant measures ex parte 
should be limited to certain measures. It would in my opinion not be appropriate to grant 
for example anticipatory measures or far reaching measures in the field of intellectual 
property without the defendant being heard. Also the European Court of Justice ruled that 
measures granted ex parte are not to be recognised and enforced under the Brussels 
                                                     
38  See para 6.1 above. 
39  In my Ph.D. Thesis (see note 23) I made the following proposal for the Brussels 
Convention/Regulation on the basis of the Van Uden decision: “The preceding provisions do not effect 
the jurisdiction of the courts of other member states to order provisional or protective measures as may 
be available under their law, provided that there is real connecting link between the subject-matter of 
the measure sought and the territory of that state. In any case a real connecting link is present if the 
measure, or part of it, is to take effect in that state”. (see the English summary, p. 368).
40  See Van Uden (para 6.2 above), no 48. 
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Convention.41 This draft does not seem to attach this consequence to remedies that were 
granted ex parte.    
  
7.5 Recourse and withdrawal  
 
Article 10.5.1-3 on recourse are a valuable contribution to the harmonisation of 
provisional and protective measures. To me it is not fully clear whether further appeal (in 
cassation) is also possible. For example in the Netherlands, France and Belgium the 
provisional decision (kort geding; référé) can be appealed at the Court of Appeal and also 
be brought before the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad, Cour de Cassation, Hof van Cassatie) 
for cassation. In other countries, such as Germany, cassation at the Supreme Court is not 
possible (see § 545,2 Zivilprozeßordnung).42
 Article 10.6.1-2 on variation and withdrawal of the remedy are also useful and 
necessary for harmonisation. But the rules in this regard are not the same in the European 
countries, and some explication might be needed. For example, must the request to vary, 
set aside or reverse the decision be done at the same court/judge that ordered the first 
measure, and is this procedure to be commenced in the same way as an initial procedure 
leading to a provisional measure?43  
    
7.6 Enforcement of provisional measures 
 
Article 10.8.1-2 are in my opinion also fundamental for harmonisation of provisional 
measures. These provisions seem to me to be quite clear. But maybe the decisions of the 
Court of Justice regarding the enforcement of provisional and protective measures are also 
of importance in this regard. In the Denilauler case, the Court decided that ex parte 
measures cannot be enforced under the Brussels Convention.44 Is seems to me that not 
hearing the defendant is not an obstacle under this draft (see also 7.4 above), whereas in 
international litigation it is, at least when the enforcement is to take place in another 
country.  
 
 
Dr. Xandra E. Kramer 
Rotterdam 
                                                     
41  Denilauler/Couchet case, see note 24. 
42  See Kramer 2001 (note 23), p. 32, 54-55, 74 
43  E.g. in the Netherlands a second kort geding must be commenced (in the same way as the first one) in 
order to get another measure. However, the request to set aside a measure that falls under the scope of 
Article 50 TRIPS agreement is not a kort geding, but just a formality.  
44  Also the Mietz case (see para 6.1) might have implications for international enforcement, but this is 
still not very clear, and also dependant upon the rules of jurisdiction. 
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